



THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

FSB sn
CIA/ONE-Hit
American Embassy,
Paris, France,
October 9, 1962.

OFFICIAL-INFORMAL

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Dear Mr. Hilsman:

I appreciate your thoughtfulness in sending me a copy of Washington's latest estimate of Soviet intentions on Berlin. I, too, feel that the Soviet pronouncement of September 11 indicates Moscow intends to delay signing a separate German peace treaty, at least until sometime after our elections. However, an important question is Soviet motivation for this delay. Is it because Moscow fears that tensions are currently too high to risk aggravating the Berlin problem or is it possible that the Soviet leadership has not yet decided what action to take in Berlin? At any rate, I think some consideration might be given to the view the French have expressed to us that the September 11 reference to our elections was merely a "pretext" for delaying the peace treaty and was designed to give Moscow an appearance of reasonableness and understanding of Washington's problems. The Quai's working level feels that this "pretext" is, in fact, designed to cover up Moscow's indecision in the present stage of the problem.

Were Moscow to introduce the Berlin problem into the UN, would not such action restrict Soviet freedom to pursue its policy of "salami tactics"? Although UN discussion of the problem could affect the forcefulness with which the West might react to individual Soviet actions, simultaneously it seems to me it might tend to inhibit Moscow from taking new steps affecting the status of Berlin. (Moscow might find it difficult conveniently to introduce changes in a situation which was being discussed.) Another factor which Khrushchev would undoubtedly consider before turning over the solution of the Berlin problem to the UN was the effect such a transfer would have on his ability to control the course of events affecting the city. It would

seem to me....

Roger Hilsman, Esquire,
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Department of State,
Washington 25, D.C.

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State Dept. review completed

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seem to me that Khrushchev would prefer to avoid a situation wherein UN pressure might be used to impose a solution not completely satisfactory to the Soviets. Finally, I believe U Thant made it clear to Khrushchev that the UN should not be saddled with the Berlin problem. Khrushchev must be aware of the disruptive effect the question would have on the UN organization. I am not completely convinced that Khrushchev is ready to see the UN subjected to the extreme stresses which Berlin might engender and thus wonder whether the Soviets will bring the question to the UN for final settlement. If they do, then this would probably reflect Khrushchev's despair at finding another solution without some very disturbing consequences.

I submit the above comments with some hesitation since I am no longer able to follow Berlin events at close range, though after my years there the subject naturally continues to fascinate me.

Sincerely yours,

Cecil B. Lyon

Done for the course

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